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DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS IN
GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS
By Alan Carlson and Bruce Phillips*
In a government like ours, entirely popular, care should be
taken in every part of the system, not only to do it right, but to
satisfy that community that right is done.1
Introduction
In response to the acts of public agents which arbitrarily deprived
individuals of life, liberty, or property, the common law early developed
safeguards to protect those principles of liberty and justice fundamental
to a free government. The requirements of due process were the
devices by which self-governing communities protected "the rights of
individuals and minorities, as well against the power of numbers, as
against the violence of public agents transcending the limits of lawful
authority, even when acting in the name and wielding the force of the
government.' 2 In circumstances involving the power of numbers it was
not arbitrary power but the legitimate interests of the group as a whole
that clashed with the rights of individuals. The very creation of
authority involves the loss by individuals of some of their personal free-
dom. The survival and efficiency of the group become essential to
securing and enjoying even individual interests, and necessitate sur-
rendering some measure of individual liberty. Due process constitutes
a restraint on those who exercise authority over the affairs of others
so that neither institutional security, operative efficiency, nor the will
of the majority are in themselves complete or sufficient excuses for dis-
regarding anyone's individual interests. The first citizens of this
country so believed in the need for such restraints that they incorpo-
rated them into the Bill of Rights as one of the fundamental limitations
on the conduct of government.3
* Members, second year class.
1. 5 THa WRIINGs AN SPEEcHEs op DANiEL WEBSTER 163 (National Ed. 1903)
(remarks made before the House of Representatives on Jan. 4, 1826 regarding a bill to
amend the judiciary system).
2. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 536 (1884).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law... "
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One instance in which due process of law is required is at hearings
where an individual has substantial interests at stake. The Supreme
Court has recently held that due process requires that welfare recipients
be afforded an evidentiary hearing before termination of benefits, 4 and
that summary wage garnishment procedures which fail to provide a
hearing are invalid.5 In the labor relations field, however, the Court
has been less direct in establishing constitutional protections. In
particular, constitutional safeguards have not been expressly required
at hearings that occur as part of grievance arbitrations. Yet huch hear-
ings can have drastic effects upon the livelihood of the grievant in-
volved.' He or she may lose a job7 or important seniority rights, or
establish or lengthen an adverse discipline record. Because these in-
terests are so important to a grievant it would be manifestly unjust to
allow the employee to use his or her job, wages, or other employment
interests as the result of an arbitration proceeding without insuring that
the hearing was a fair one. Indeed a requirement of due process safe-
guards could be easily met s and would have only slight effect upon the
freedom of the employer and the labor organization to negotiate a col-
lective bargaining agreement.
The purpose of this note, then, is 1) to determine if due process
standards guaranteed by the Constitution extend to grievance arbitra-
tion situations,9 and 2) if so, to what degree. This examination will
first explore the constitutional underpinnings of a due process require-
ment and then delineate specific safeguards to be afforded the grievant.
The examination of the constitutional considerations involved in
the arbitral process is aided by an understanding of the circumstances
in which they arise. To this end the following sequence of events is
assumed to have occurred. Some action has been taken against an
individual, such as suspension, discharge or other disciplinary action,
by his or her employer in an environment in which the employees are
represented by a labor organization chosen by a majority of the
employees."0 Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement a
4. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
5. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
6. See Tobriner, An Appellate Judge's View of the Labor Arbitration Process:
Due Process and the Arbitration Process, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 20TH ANNuAL MEET-
ING NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 37, 39 (D. Jones ed. 1967).
7. "Today membership in a union is often the sine qua non for obtaining employ-
ment in most skilled crafts in this country; it frequently spells the difference between
lucrative employment and exclusion from the craft." NLRB v. Mansion House Center
Management Corp., 473 F.2d 471, 472 (8th Cir. 1973).
8. See text accompanying notes 75-137 infra.
9. For a discussion of "industrial" due process, see Comment, Industrial Due
Process and Just Cause for Discipline: A Comparative Analysis of the Arbitral and Ju-
dicial Decisional Processes, 6 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 603 (1959).
10. It is further assumed that the relationship between the employer and labor or-
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grievance has been filed about the action taken. The grievance has
been properly advanced through all stages of the grievance procedure
with timely appeals, and a solution satisfactory to the employer and the
union has not been reached. Arbitration is invoked by either the
employer or the labor organization, and during the hearing, some event
occurs which denies the grievant due process to his or her substantial
prejudice. An arbitration award is rendered and the question is raised
as to the effect of the award in subsequent judicial proceedings involv-
ing the same incident.
I. Governmental Action and Constitutional Regulation
The requirement that an individual be afforded a full and fair
hearing before being deprived of any employment related interests is
derived from the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 1 These amendments, however, apply only to govern-
mental action. 12  Thus the threshold question to the application of a
due process analysis is whether or not there is governmental action.
Although grievance arbitrations appear to involve only private agree-
ments and private action, "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing
circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the [government] in
private conduct he attributed its true significance."'1 3  Governmental
action sufficient to invoke constitutional protections may be found for
either of two reasons. In the first place the relationship between labor
organizations, employers, and employees is regulated by federal law
The labor organization represents the employees by virtue of the
authority granted it by the federal government, and federal law has
placed certain responsibilities upon such organizations when dealing
with those it represents. Secondly, governmental action is invoked if
either the labor organization or the employer seeks enforcement of an
arbitration award by a federal or state court.
A. Federal Regulation of Labor Relations
The question of providing constitutional protection in certain activ-
ities, based upon governmental regulation of one or more of the
ganization is controlled by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.
(1970), and these two parties are assumed to have negotiated an agreement containing
a clause providing for arbitration as the final step of the grievance process. This arbi-
tration clause provides that arbitration may be invoked only by the labor organization
or employer, and contains no language regarding the procedural aspects of the arbitra-
tion hearing. For an example of such a clause, see note 23 infra.
11. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
12. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926) (Fifth Amendment); see
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 9 (1948) (Fourteenth Amendment).
13. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
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participants, was recently addressed by the Supreme Court in Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Co."4 In Jackson the plaintiff claimed that ter-
mination of service without notice by a state regulated power company
deprived her of property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court noted that the mere fact of state regulation of a business
did not by itself make the acts of the business those of the state, nor
did the fact that the regulation was "extensive and detailed" do so.1"
The proper inquiry, the Court stated, was "whether there is a suffici-
ently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the
regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as
that of the State itself."' 6 The Court then rejected the claim that the
monopoly status granted by the state to the company provided such a
nexus, because of the insufficient relationship between the challenged
action and the monopoly status." The Court also rejected the claim
that the nexus was provided by state approval of the termination pro-
cedure, finding that the state had not in fact expressly approved that
procedure.'
Applying this analysis to the arbitral process the issue centers
around the exclusive bargaining status conferred upon the labor organi-
zation by federal statute and the federal policy sanctioning the dispute
settlement procedures adopted for use by the labor organization and
the employer. The question raised is whether this express approval
of the arbitral procedure agreed upon by the parties is a sufficient
nexus to render the conduct in the arbitration proceedings govern-
mental action.
Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act'I grants the
labor organization chosen by a majority of the employees in a unit the
authority to act as the exclusive bargaining representative of the
employees for the purposes of collective bargaining. In this section
Congress granted the bargaining representative "powers comparable to
those possessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict the
rights of those whom it represents .... -20 Under this authority a
labor organization may enter into an agreement with the employer
which provides for arbitration as the final stage of the grievance
14. 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974).
15. Id. at 453.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 454.
18. Id. at 455.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970): "Representatives designated or selected for the
purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate
for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit
for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of em-
ployment, or other conditions of employment. . ....
20. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).
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process. Although the first proviso of section 9(a) gives any individual
employee or group of employees the statutory right to present and ad-
just their own grievances with their employer, 2 there is no similar
statutory right to take one's grievance to arbitration.2 2 Such a right
could be granted in the collective bargaining agreement but it seldom
is. 3
In addition the Court has found that the grant of authority in sec-
tion 9(a) precludes bargaining by employees with their employer on an
individual or group basis where such bargaining limits or conditions the
terms of the prevailing collective bargaining agreement.24 Thus a
labor organization, acting under the authority of law, may enter into
an agreement to arbitrate matters affecting employees, including their
discharge, reserving to itself the discretion as to when arbitration will
be invoked.
Furthermore, Congress has expressed approval of dispute settle-
ment procedures such as arbitration in section 203(d) of the Labor
Management Relations Act:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is de-
clared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance dis-
putes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing
collective-bargaining agreement.
25
The Supreme Court has interpreted this policy as placing "sanctions
behind agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes,' 26 and has held that
courts are not to review the merits of an arbitration award except in
very limited circumstancesY.2  Federal labor policy also requires that
21. "[Alny individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at
any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted,
without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is
not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then
in effect ... ." 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
22. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
23. E.g., Agreement Between Pacific Gas & Electric Co. and Local No. 1245,
I.B.E.W. § 102.12 (effective July 1, 1970); "Either Company or Union may request that
any grievance which is not settled by the procedure hereinabove described be submitted
to arbitration." (emphasis added). The policy behind permitting only the union and
employer to invoke arbitration is that "at this stage, a grievance is not an individual
matter but a matter of relationships between [the employer] and the union." Massey,
Employee Grievance Procedures, in DEVELOPMNTS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS:
LEGISLATIVE, JuIicrAL, ADmINIsTATrvE 70 (K.O. Warner ed. 1965).
24. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S, 332, 339 (1944).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970).
26. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957). See also
Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 377 (1974).
27. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596
(1960). For a discussion of the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards see
Dunau, Scope of Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW
Yoax UmvEsriy 24THANNuAL CONFERENCE ON LABok 175 (1971).
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an employee at least attempt to use the grievance procedures provided
in the collective bargaining agreement before bringing suit on the
agreement.2 8  In light of the exclusive authority granted the labor
organization and the sanctioning of arbitration, the question arises as
to whether a labor organization acts in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment when it participates in an arbitration proceeding in which an em-
ployee it represents is denied rights without due process of law.
The theory that a labor organization is subject to certain constitu-
tional limitations when exercising its statutory authority as exclusive
bargaining representative was recognized early by the Supreme Court
in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.2" In Steele the Court
dealt with a situation in which the union had intentionally negotiated
a seniority agreement which discriminated against blacks in the bar-
gaining unit. In interpreting language in the Railway Labor Act3 0 com-
parable to that in the National Labor Relations Act' the Court stated
that "[i]f . . , the Act confers this power on the bargaining representa-
tive of a craft or class of employees without any commensurate statutory
duty toward its members, constitutional questions arise."3  The
nature of these constitutional questions was more squarely addressed
by Justice Murphy in his concurring opinion:
The constitutional problem inherent. in this instance is clear.
Congress, through the Railway Labor Act, has conferred upon the
union . .. the power to represent the entire craft or class in all
collective bargaining matters. While such a union is essentially a
private organization, its power to represent and bind all members
of a class or craft is derived solely from Congress. . . . [I]t cannot
be assumed that Congress meant to authorize the representative to
act so as to ignore rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Other-
wise the Act would bear the stigma of unconstitutionality under the
Fifth Amendment in this respect. For that reason I am willing
-to read the statute as not permitting or allowing any action by the
bargaining representative in the exercise of its delegated powers
which would in effect violate the constitutional rights of individ-
uals.33
Declining to find the statute constitutionally inadequate, the
majority instead reasoned that a duty of fair and equal representation
28. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965).
29. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
30. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth (1970): "Upon receipt of such certification [of the
names of the individuals or organizations that have been designated and authorized to
represent the employees] the carrier shall treat with the representative so certified as
the representative of the craft or class for the purposes of this chapter." (emphasis
added).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
32. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 198 (1944).
33. Id. at 208-09 (Murphy, I., concurring).
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owed by the labor organization to those it represents is implied from
the act read as a whole, and was intended by Congress.34 The Court,
however, did adopt constitutional configurations in specifying the
nature of this duty:
We think that the Railway Labor Act imposes upon the statutory
representative of a craft at least as exacting a duty to protect
equally the interests of the members of the craft as the Constitution
imposes upon a legislature to give equal protection to the interests
of those for whom it legislates.
35
In the same year the Supreme Court imposed a similar duty on a bar-
gaining agent operating under the NLRA.36 Thus when a labor
organization is acting on behalf of employees, it is under an obligation
defined by the Constitution, if not derived from it, to treat all those
it represents fairly and equally.37 In Steele this duty was held to exist
when the labor organization was negotiating an agreement. The same
duty has been found to exist when the labor organization is enforcing
the agreement it has negotiated. 8
In the Steele case the union, acting as bargaining agent under
authority of federal law, negotiated an agreement which discriminated
against a minority of employees because of their race. The union was
held to have breached its duty to those it represented because it denied
some of them equal protection under the agreement. In an arbitration
situation the constitutional issue is not one of equal protection but one
of procedural due process. When a union represents an individual in
an arbitration proceeding, it is acting pursuant to an agreement it
negotiated under federal authority and in a proceeding sanctioned by
federal law.
The due process concepts of notice and fair hearing in the arbitral
setting were addressed by the Court in Humphrey v. Moore."9 This
situation involved two employers, one of whom sold his authority to do
business in an area as well as some of his terminals and equipment to
the other employer. The collective bargaining relationship was de-
termined by a multi-employer, multi-local bargaining agreement, the
same union representing the employees of both employers. The
question of the seniority rights of the employees of the selling company
34. Id. at 199-202.
35. Id. at 202.
36. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255 (1944). See also Syres v. Oil
Workers, Local No. 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (per curium decision citing Steele); Ford
Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
37. For a criticism of this conclusion, see Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor
Union, and 'Governmental Action,' 70 YALE L.. 345 (1961).
38. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964); accord Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 46 (1957) (under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970)).
39. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
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was submitted to a Joint Conference Committee ° pursuant to the
agreement. The committee determined that the seniority rights of
these employees should be continuous when hired by the surviving
employer. Since these workers had greater seniority rights, this
determination resulted in the layoff of several employees of the surviv-
ing employer. The employees who lost their jobs filed suit against the
union alleging that the union had violated its duty of fair representation
by deceiving the employees with respect to their job and seniority
rights, conspiring to deprive them of their employment rights, and pre-
venting them from having a fair hearing before the joint conference
committee. 41
After analyzing the situation the Court found that the union had
acted in good faith and without hostility or arbitrary discrimination, and
held that the union had not breached its duty of fair representation.42
The Court then proceeded to the allegation that the employees had
been denied a fair hearing. The Court noted that three shop stewards
from the employees' union local not only attended the hearing but also
were given every opportunity to state their position. In addition the
Court found that the complaining employees were notified of the hear-
ing, made no request to continue the hearing, and further failed to
suggest what they could have added to the hearing if they had been
differently represented. 43  By its analysis the Court suggests that the
employees had a right to a fair hearing, at least with respect to ade-
quate representation of their interests.44 It thus appears that when a
union is involved in a hearing which may adversely affect the jobs or
seniority rights of employees it represents, the union must make sure
that 1) the employee is notified of the hearing, 2) the employee's in-
terests are represented by someone at the hearing, and 3) that these
interests are adequately and fully considered.
Subsequent cases in lower courts have recognized similar require-
ments with respect to arbitration or similar dispute settlement pro-
cedures.4 5  In Price v. Teamsters Union,40 involving conflicting em-
40. This proceeding is comparable to an arbitration proceeding for purposes here.
41. 375 U.S. at 343.
42. Id. at 350.
43. The Court, however, overlooked the fact that the employees did not have the
right to intervene at the hearing, that they had been assured that their jobs and seniority
rights were not in jeopardy, and that they were not aware of what had transpired until
it was too late to object, intervene or seek a continuance of the hearing.
44. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (the Supreme Court required only
that the parties interests be represented and not that the party itself be represented);
Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349 (1855) (nonlabor arbitration); Clark
v. Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wise. 2d 264, 272, 99 N.W.2d 132 (1959), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 962 (1960).
45. Price v. Teamsters Union, 457 F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1972); Holodnak v. Avco
[Vol. 2
ployee interests and a procedure very similar to that in Humphrey, the
court indicated that a union would breach its duty if both sets of inter-
ests were not given an opportunity in the hearing to be represented and
considered by the committee. 47 In holding that the union had not
breached its duty the court indicated what conduct would constitute
such a breach:
While the union must give appellants' local ofifcers an opportunity
to make their case and then decide the question honestly and im-
partially . . . we believe they performed their required duties in
this case. The record shows that the various committees that
considered the problem gave full and protracted consideration to
the arguments of both sides.48
Further examples of the requirements that the employee's interest
be adequately presented in an arbitration proceeding are found in
Easley v. District 50, Allied & Technical Workers49 and in Holodnak
v. Avco Corp.50 In Easley the plaintiffs claimed that they had been
inadequately represented in an arbitration proceeding because their
attorney 1) was involved in a conflict of interests and 2) had prevented
them from testifying on their own behalf about a matter they thought
crucial to their case.51 The court, sitting without a jury, found that the
arbitration award was rendered on grounds other than those involved
in the plaintiff's claim5" and that the union had adequately represented
them, thereby discharging its obligation of fair representation.
53
In Holodnak54 the court, in addressing the question of adequacy
of representation, found that the union's representation in an arbitration
proceeding was not adequate to discharge its obligation.55  The court
noted that the attorney representing the plaintiff at the hearing failed
to object to testimony in the hearing which was irrelevant to the issues
and which the court characterized as part of an "inquisition" into the
plaintiff's beliefs.5 6 In addition the court found the attorney's brief to
be "at best a misguided attempt to plead for mercy from the arbitrator
. . . and. . . at worst an indication of the union's bad faith. '57 The
Corp., 381 F. Supp. 191 (D. Conn. 1974); Easley v. District 50, Allied & Technical
Workers, 377 F. Supp. 729 (M.D. La. 1974).
46. 457 F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1972).
47. Id. at 611.
48. Id. (emphasis added).
49. 377 F. Supp. 729 (M.D. La. 1974).
50. 381 F. Supp. 191 (D. Conn. 1974).
51. 377 F. Supp. at 731.
52. Id. at 731-32.
53. Id. at 734.
54. 381 F. Supp. 191 (D. Conn. 1974).
55. Id. at 199-200.
56. Id. at 200.
57. Id.
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brief also failed to make certain points which the court thought essential
to adequate representation. Because of this inadequacy of representa-
tion at the hearing the court held that the union had violated its duty
and gave judgment for the plaintiff.58 Collectively these cases indicate
that when a labor organization acts as the exclusive representative of
an employee in an arbitration proceeding it is under an obligation to
provide at least minimal due process by adequately and fully represent-
ing the employee's interests.
B. Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Awards
In addition to federal regulation, governmental action may be
found in a court's enforcement of an arbitration award in litigation aris-
ing from the underlying dispute. If a grievant was denied a fair hear-
ing in an arbitration proceeding, the court's enforcement of the
resulting award renders the court a willing participant in the abridgment
of the individual's rights. The court's involvement may in fact be the
decisive factor in determining whether or not the individual will be
denied his or her rights. Such involvement by courts has been
recognized as governmental action in several circumstances, usually
involving issues of racial discrimination.59
A situation analagous to court enforcement of an arbitation award
can be found in Shelley v. Kraemer.60 There a group of homeowners
had agreed by covenant aimaong themselves not to sell their homes to
blacks. One homeowner, however, subsequently sold to a black. A
co-covenantor brought an action to enforce the restrictive covenant
against the black and thereby divest him of title to the home. In its
analysis the Supreme Court first noted that the equal protection clause 1
applied only to state action."2 An agreement between property owners
could not itself be held invalid because there was no state action which
denied anyone equal protection of the laws. However there was a
question as to "whether enforcement by state courts of the restrictive
agreements . . .may be deemed to be the acts of those States; and,
if so, whether that action has denied these [black] petitioners the equal
protection of the laws. . . -63 The Court concluded that the enforce-
ment was state action in that it placed the full weight of state power
58. Id. at 207.
59. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis; 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972); Barrows v. Jack-
son, 346 U.S. 249, 254 (1953); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18 (1948).
60. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "No State shall ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
62. 334 U.S. at 9.
63. Id. at 18.
[Vol. 2
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behind the agreement and that the court's enforcement was the differ-
ence between according the buyer full enjoyment of his rights and
denying them.
64
Having found state action the Supreme Court ruled that a state
court violated the equal protection clause if it enforced a restrictive
covenant thereby denying a willing purchaser enjoyment of property
rights on the basis of his race.65 Thus enforcement of an agreement
by a state court is an act subject to constitutional restraints though the
agreement itself cannot be said to be invalid as unconstitutional.
Presumably a similar result would be reached if a federal court
enforced an arbitration agreement thereby denying someone an oppor-
tunity for a full and fair hearing in violation of the due process clause. 66
It is clear from Shdlley that an agreement between a labor organi-
zation and an employer which denies or works to deny employees due
process is not and cannot be declared invalid by the courts because it
is purely private action that is involved-" So long as the agreement
and resulting award are adhered to voluntarily there is no governmental
action and neither the Fifth nor the Fourteenth Amendment has been
violated. However, if either party refuses to comply and the other
party seeks court enforcement of the award,"8 there is governmental
action. In such an action the court would be bound by the Fifth
Amendment if it is a federal court and the Fourteenth Amendment if
it is a state court. The question of enforcement as governmental action
also arises if the grievant, dissatisfied with the arbitration award, brings
suit on the same transaction in court. The suit could be a section 30169
suit against the employer for breach of the collective bargaining agree-
ment.7° In such a suit the enforcement of the arbitration award would
be raised by virtue of the Supreme Court's pronouncement that courts
are not to review an arbitration award so long as it draws its "essence"
64. Id. at 19.
65. Id. at 20.
66. See Railway Employes' Dept., A.F. of L. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956) in
which the Court noted that a court's enforcement of a union shop clause would consti-
tute state action in the Shelley sense. Id. at 232 n. 4. See also Hurd v. Hodge, 334
U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948) (holding that it would be contrary to the public policy of the
United States to allow a federal court to enforce an agreement constitutionally unen-
forceable in state courts).
67. Ignore for purposes here that the labor organization is acting under the author-
ity of federal law, discussed in text accompanying notes 19-31 supra.
68. E.g., United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960).
69. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1970). "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
... may be brought in any district court of the United States .... "
70. Smith v. Evening News Assoc., 371 U.S. 195, 200-01 (1962).
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from the collective bargaining agreement.71 Thus the enforceability of
the arbitration award is directly in issue.
In determining whether the Shelley doctrine is applicable to a pro-
ceeding involving the enforcement of an arbitration award, one further
question arises. In Shelley the court was asked to enforce the very
agreement which denied the buyer equal protection of the laws. In
an arbitration award context it is the award which a party seeks to en-
force, but it is the agreement to arbitrate which permits the denial of
due process to a grievant. However, in enforcing the award the court
is condoning, if not sanctioning, the arbitration proceeding in which the
grievant's fights were abridged. This is true whether the arbitration
involves the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement or the
application of that agreement. In either case the court's act of enforce-
ment will determine whether or not the grievant's rights will be
protected or denied.
The Court subsequently expanded the Shelley concept in Barrows
v. Jackson, 2 holding that a state court would violate the Fourteenth
Amendment if the effect of the enforcement of a private agreement
was to encourage discrimination and denial of enjoyment of property
rights based on race. In Barrows the suit was by one co-covenantor
against another for damages for breach of the covenant. The Court
refused to enforce the covenant because to do so would encourage the
use of restrictive covenants and coerce property owners subject to such
covenants to continue to use their property in a discriminatory man-
ner.73 The analogous action involving the enforcement of an arbitra-
tion award would be an action by a labor organization or an employer
to force the other to comply with the award rendered in a proceeding
unfair to the grievant. The number of cases to which this theory would
apply would be reduced by the limitation that the enforcement would
have to be shown to encourage labor organizations and/or employers
to conduct proceedings in a manner which denies grievants due process,
or to coerce unions or employers into continued use of proceedings
which deny due process to grievants. 74 The severity of this require-
ment may in fact reduce the set of cases meeting the requirement to
the null set.
In summary, Shelley and Barrows suggest three types of cases in
which a court's enforcement of an arbitration award would violate the
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment if an individual was denied due
process of the law in an arbitration proceeding. The first is where the
71. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596-97
(1960).
72. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).




bargaining agent or employer seeks to enforce an award against the
non-complying party. The second is where enforcement is sought by
the employer or labor organization in an action by a grievant against
it based on the same facts. The third would be an action seeking en-
forcement of an award by a labor organization or employer against the
other where the enforcement encourages or coerces a party to deny a
grievant due process of law at the arbitration hearing.
H. Specific Procedural Safeguards
Having identified the sources of the constitutional requirement of
due process in arbitrations in the preceding section, this note will now
proceed to explore those elements which satisfy this requirement.
7 5
This section will itemize some of the procedural safeguards that should
become a permanent part of grievance arbitrations. The focus is on
the specific due process protections of notice, right to counsel and inter-
vention, and the right of confrontation and cross-examination. Addi-
tional areas discussed include self-incrimination, search and seizure,
use of past conduct, standards of evidence, and burden of proof.
Examples of the inequities resulting from denial of these important pro-
cedural rights will be given, followed by a discussion of how the arbitral
process can best be adapted to provide these procedural rights.
A. Notice
If the individual employee is to be afforded any due process rights
at all in the arbitral process, it is self-evident that the right of notice,
both of the hearing itself, and of the charge, if it is a disciplinary hear-
ing, is the most fundamental right. Obviously, if the employee is
unaware of the arbitral hearing, questions about the right against self-
incrimination, the right to counsel, and the right to confrontation of wit-
nesses will never arise.
In proper judicial proceedings it is axiomatic that parties to the
controversy are afforded notice. Notice, or at least the opportunity to
appear, is fundamental to our legal system. In recent years, the courts
have begun to expand this concept to less formal proceedings, such as
parole revocation hearings.
76
In disciplinary hearings particularly, thc. employee should not only
be given notice, but the notice should inform her of the true charge
75. For background on the requirements of due process see, Warren, The New
"Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARv. L. REv. 431 (1926); Symposium,
Due Process, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 785 (1974).
76. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1972); accord, Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare due process).
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against her, so that she can adequately prepare a defense.77 The arbi-
trator should pay particular attention to this requirement when it
appears that defending the individual employee's interest is not
necessarily in the best interest of the union.78  The arbitrator should
remember that, for the individual employee, the stakes may be high,
his or her job, and reputation, might be seriously damaged as a result
of the proceeding.
But in justice and fairness every person who may be adversly
affected by an order entered by the Board should be given reason-
able notice of -the hearing. . . . No man should be deprived of his
means of livelihood, without a fair opportunity to defend himself.
Plainly, that is the intent of the law. The case at bar illustrates
how a single employee may be caught between the upper and
nether millstones in a controversy to which only a labor organiza-
tion and a carrier are parties before the Board. It is not necessary
for an employee to be named as a party to the proceeding before
the Board to be involved in the controversy within the meaning
of the law."
79
Arbitration cases generally, indicate that in serious disciplinary
cases, notice of the true charge is a fundamental requirement. 0
Any difficulties in making sure all concerned parties are given
notice does not appear to be an insurmountable problem. As arbitra-
tion proceedings are not formalized procedures, a requirement to use
a reasonable method under the circumstances of each case would be
sufficient. The method used need only inform the proper parties of
the action that is to take place. 81
77. See American Enka Corp., 68-2 CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDS 8558 at 4917
(1967) (Pigors, Arbitrator).
78. "We do not believe that the requiring of the giving of notice, and an opportun-
ity to intervene, to those employees not being fairly represented in the arbitration by
the union, as a condition to the award being binding on such employees, will prove dis-
ruptive of the arbitration process." Clark v. Hein-Werner Corp., 8 Wis. 2d 264, 275, 99
N.W.2d 132, 138 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 762 (1960).
79. Estes v. Union Terminal Co., 89 F.2d 768, 770 (5th Cir. 1937) (involved the
Railway Labor Act); accord, Primakow v. Railway Express Agency, 56 F. Supp. 413,
416 (E.D. Wis. 1943); see also 0. FAiRWEATHER, PRAcCE AND PROCEDURE IN LADOR
ARnRATION 143 (1973) [hereinafter cited as FAIRWEATHER].
80. See Comment, Industrial Due Process and Just Cause for Discipline: A Com-
parative Analysis of the Arbitral and Judicial Decisional Processes, 6 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
603, 631-33 (1959) [hereinafter referred to as Industrial Due Process] citing the follow-
ing: "Mhe discharge . .. must stand or fall on the reason given at the time of the
discharge." West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 10 Lab. Arb. 117, 118 (1947) (Guthrie,
Arbitrator); "The company may not properly be permitted to st-te only some of the
charges against the employee and then later defend its discharge acion upon the basis
of additional charges to which the employee . . . had not an opportunity to reply."
Bethlehem Steel Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 635 (1957) (Steward, Arbitrator).
81. See, Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration, 37
N.Y.U.L. REv. 362, 408 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Summers]. Prof. Summers indicates
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The giving of notice to persons concerned in the arbitration is
encouraged by the American Arbitration Association in their Voluntary
Labor Arbitration Rules, 2 and in some state codes. 3
It is manifestly clear that the public policy in arbitration as regards
notice should be the same as in other proceedings where enforceable
awards can be made. As Mr. Justice Sutherland, writing for the Court
in Powell v. Alabama84 stated: "It has never been doubted by this
court. . that notice and hearing are preliminary steps essential to the
passing of an enforceable judgment, and that they. . . constitute basic
elements of the constitutional requirement of due process of law."'8 5
B. Right to Counsel/Intervention
Concurrent with the right to notice and appearance is the right to
counsel. Logic dictates that basic to the right to be heard is the right
to be heard effectively. Denial of effective representation would make
the right to appearance meaningless. Normally, of course, the union
represents the employee in his or her grievance arbitration hearing, and
usually does an effective job. In those cases, undoubtedly the majority
of arbitration cases, the need giving rise to the employee's right to coun-
sel is fully satisfied by the union representation he or she receives. A
problem arises, however, when successful representation of the em-
ployee would be adverse to the union's interest. It is in this area that
gross abuse of justice and fairness may arise.
An example of this problem may be found in In re Soto.8 6  In
that case dissatisfied employees who had left their original union
(National Jewelry Workers) joined a rival union and went out on a
wildcat strike. After the strike was enjoined and the employees had
gone back to work, the employer charged them with slowdown tactics
and notified the Jewelry Workers union that the employees would be
discharged from work. The union requested arbitration. The employ-
ees were notified of the arbitration hearing and came to the hearing
with their own attorney, pointing out that the attorney for the Jewelry
approval of a right to notice, and notes that the instituting of the right need not be
too formalized. If the grievance affects an individual, some form of direct communica-
tions is desirable, and actual notice might be required. If the grievance affects a group,
notice by posting might be sufficient.
82. Rule 22 "Attendance at Hearings-Persons having a direct interest in the ar-
bitration are entitled to attend hearings." AmmBcRAN ARnrrnoN AssocIATioN, VOL-
ui'TARY LABOR ARBi-RA-ioN RULES 4 (1970) [hereinafter cited as ARBi-RATION RuLMS].
83. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW & RuLas § 7506(b) (McKinney 1963); CAL.
CODE CIV. PROC. § 1282.2(d) (West 1972).
84. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
85. Id. at 68-69.
86. 7 N.Y.2d 397, 165 N.E.2d 855, 198 N.Y.S.2d 282 (1960).
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Workers union had also appeared as counsel for the employer in enjoin-
ing the wildcat strike and in proceedings against the rival union; they
contended that he would not adequately represent them. The arbitra-
tor, however, held that the employees had no right to independent
counsel, because -the union was the sole bargaining agent under the
collective bargaining agreement. The hearing proceeded, the employer
made his case, the union put forth no defense, and, on the record estab-
lished, the arbitrator upheld the discharges.
The lower court vacated the arbitration award on the grounds that
the individual employees should have been allowed to intervene since
the element of lack of fair representation was present.87  The court of
appeals reversed, stating that only a "party" to the arbitration could
move to vacate the award, and that the employees were not parties."
The manifest injustice inherent in situations such as that outlined
above indicate that public policy considerations require that employees
who are not being represented fairly, or are likely to be inadequately
represented due to some conflict of interest, should be allowed their
own representation. There is no logical reason, under these circum-
stances, to deny the real party in interest (the individual employee
whose future may be at stake) rights as a party to the proceeding. 9
The right of employees to intervene in grievance discharge arbi-
tration is, however, beginning to be recognized. Professor Summers of
Yale University has suggested how some of the purposes of collective
bargaining are actually diminished by withholding the rights of inter-
vention and counsel in appropriate cases:
87. Soto v. Lenscraft Optical Corp., 7 App. Div. 2d 1, 180 N.Y.S.2d 388 (App.
Div. 1958).
88. 7 N.Y.2d 397, 399, 165 N.E.2d 855, 856, 198 N.Y.S.2d 282, 283 (1960); ac-
cord, Bailor v. Teamsters Local 470, 400 Pa. 188, 161 A.2d 343, 347 (1960). See
Hildreth v. Union News Co., 315 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 826
(1963). Ms. Hildreth was discharged for "just cause" even though there was not even
an assertion that she had committed any act or acts constituting such "just cause" or
that she was a "poor employee." The union refused to file a grievance, per an agree-
ment worked out between the union and the employer. The court held that Ms.
Hildreth could not file the grievance herself, since the union was exclusive representative
of all employees and as such the union and the employer could conclude that her firing
was for just cause so long as no fraud, bad faith, or collusion with the employer was
found. Id. at 550. (It is hard to imagine just what had to be shown to satisfy the bad
faith or collusion requirement). Accord, Simmons v. Union News Co., 341 F.2d 531
(6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 884 (1965) involved the same facts as Hildreth.
Justice Black, somewhat outraged by these cases, dissented: "The plain fact is that peti-
tioner has lost her job, not because of any guilt on her part, but because there is a suspi-
cion that someone of the group which was discharged was guilty of misconduct." Id.
at 887-88.
89. See Estes v. Union Terminal, 89 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1937).
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The needs of collective bargaining look also to the interests of the
employees and their individual rights. In simple economic terms,
the individual's interest is often of first magnitude. . . . The
individual's very livelihood is at stake. In personal terms, loss of
seniority undermines his sense of security and discharge darkens
his good name. Making the union the exclusive representative for
processing grievances subordinates those interests of individual
employees and endangers interests which collective bargaining
purposes (sic) to protect.90
Professor Summers lists three types of cases where the individual
should be allowed to intervene. 1 First, where the individual fears that
the union will not present his or her best possible case. Second, where
the individual (or group) interest is opposed by the union, and third,
where the decision being requested substantially involves the interest
of a third party.92 In judicial proceedings, representation by counsel
who has a conflict of interest constitutes denial of due process of the
law.9" "There seems little doubt that counsel who does not wish to
represent his client effectively, would also deny the accused due
process of law."94  The rules of the American Arbitration Association
also support representation by counsel.95
The arguments that allowing individual employees to intervene
with their own counsel in these types of arbitral proceedings will be
too disruptive of the process and would seriously undermine its useful-
ness is not of great weight.9 6
Such reasons lose persuasiveness when confronted with the reali-
ties of modern procedural rules allowing liberal intervention and
90. Summers, supra note 81, at 392.
91. Id. at 406-07.
92. Id. Prof. Summers' ideas have been supported by other authorities. See gen-
erally Wirtz, Due Process of Arbitration, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH ANNUAL MEET-
ING NATONAL ACADEMY OF ARirrRATORS 1, 26 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Wirtz].
Wirtz suggests that if the arbitrators do not acquiesce to this idea, he suspects that the
courts will demand it.
93. See Industrial Due Process, supra note 80 at 640 citing Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
94. Id. (emphasis in original).
95. See ARBrrRATON RuLs, supra note 82, Rule 20 "Representation by Counsel-
any party may be represented at the hearing by counsel or by other authorized represen-
tative." E.g., CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 1282.4 (West 1972): "A party to the arbitration
has the right to be represented by an attorney at any proceeding or hearing in arbitra-
tion under this title."
96. "Were each aggrieved employee permitted to be represented at an arbitration
by private counsel who has the right to question witnesses and otherwise participate fully
in the proceedings, the Local, as a trustee representative, would be effectively unable
to perform its duty. Union officials and private counsel might well be at complete log-
gerheads over what witnesses to present, in what order to present them, the efficacy of
cross-examination of a particular witness, or over any one of the myriad decisions that
enter into the conduct of a trial proceeding." Bailor v. Teamsters Local 470, 400 Pa.
188, 193, 161 A.2d 343, 347 (1960).
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joinder of parties .... It is a strange lack of confidence in the
adaptability of informal arbitration procedure to argue that it can-
not cope with such problems when the way has been shown by the
courts and administrative agencies. 97
In short "[t]he right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little
avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel."'0 s
Logically that right extends to the entire proceeding." The alleged
procedural difficulties are not of sufficient magnitude to justify restric-
tion of that right.
C. Confrontation and Cross-examination
The principle of confrontation, that is the right of an accused to
confront his or her accusers and cross-examine them, is a right that is
given constitutional protection in criminal cases everywhere in the
United States. 100 The principle has not been confined exclusively to
criminal cases, but has been extended to civil actions as well.' 01
In contrast arbitrators have been reluctant to allow confrontation
of witnesses in several situations. Typical among such situations are
those 1) where a customer complaint is the cause of the disciplinary
proceeding, 2) where a fellow employee witnesses the dispute between
the grievant and another, usually a foreman, upon which the discipli-
nary action was based, and 3) where the witness is someone retained
by the employer to observe and report on employee behavior. 10 2  The
reasons for this reluctance are understandable in each situation. When
the complaint is from a customer, the employer naturally does not want
97. Summers, supra note 81, at 406 (citations omitted); Se Clark v. Hein-
Werner Corp., 8 Wisc. 2d 264, 99 N.W.2d 132 (1959); accord, Donnelly, v. United
Fruit Co., 40 N.J. 61, 190 A.2d 825, 835 (1963); FAIRWEATHER, supra note 79, at 143:
"Where the individual employee's interest does not coincide with those of his union, thus
giving rise to a question of the adequacy of the union's representation of the employee,
the Board will not defer to the arbitration award unless the employee not only had
notice of the time and place of the hearing but had the right to be represented by his
own counsel."
98. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932); see also Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 491 (Brennan, J., concurring) (semble).
99. FAiRWEATHER, supra note 79, at 144.
100. R. FLEMING, THE. LABOR ARBrITATION PROCESS 177 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as FLEMING].
101. Id.; see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1972) (right to con-
front and cross-examine witnesses in parole revocation case); Greere v. McElroy, 360
U.S. 474, 508 (1958); accord, Dick v. United States, 339 F. Supp. 1231, 1233 (D.D.C.
1972) (administrative denial of security clearance case): "The Supreme Court in Greene
c.. oncluded that in the absence of express executive or legislative authority, a hearing
which did not provide the safeguards of confrontation and cross-examination did not
comport with our traditional ideas of fair procedure."
102. Fleming, Some Problems of Due Process and Fair Procedure in Labor Arbitra-
tion, 13 STAN. L. REV. 235, 245-47 (1961).
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to put a customer to any trouble for fear of losing him or her. In the
case of the employee witness, many employers feel that calling the wit-
ness may result in strife among the employees. This would be
potentially damaging to the employer's business, particularly if the
accused employee is reinstated. In the case of spotters, (persons who
roam around public carriers posing as customers, and watching for
employee misconduct), the employer may not want to risk the spotter's
effectiveness by revealing his or her identity. 03 In large part, arbitra-
tors have accepted the employer's arguments against production of
witnesses. For example "[h]earsay is almost universally accepted in
preference to calling one production employee against another."'10 4
Arbitration experts appear in general agreement that these prob-
lems can be overcome. It is suggested that arbitrators, with a little
inventiveness, could handle most of these situations, given the flexibil-
ity of the arbitral process.' 05 In the customer complaint category, for
example, a simple solution would allow a private talk between the ar-
bitrator and the customer with the admission of the conversation into
evidence at the subsequent hearing. Another possible solution,
adopted by one grocery store chain and a union, authorized the umpire
to receive identified customer complaints in the absence of the witness.
Then the union, or the grievant's own attorney, is given an opportunity
to check privately with the customer, and if there are any discrepancies,
the arbitrator will call in the customer. 0 6 These alternatives are
equally applicable to the second category of situations involving fellow
employee witnesses.'0 7
While it appears that arbitrators generally require the appearance
of a complaining employee witness, 08 the same is not true of spot-
ters. 0 9 Yet the argument to protect the spotters is no more compelling
than that made in the other two categories. Clearly, with a little inven-
tiveness, arbitrators could protect the spotter's identity and at the same
time have the spotter testify. The customer complaint procedures
could be used, the spotter could testify behind a screen, or other
"blind," but reliable methods could be devised. "Where the nature of
the business requires that witnesses remain anonymous, arrangements
103. Id., at 247.
104. FLEMING, supra note 100, at 179; See, WIRTZ, supra note 92, at 18. Wirtz
says that the custom of not calling bargaining-unit witnesses is the greatest single ele-
ment preventing reliable fact determination in this type of case.
105. WIRTZ, supra note 92, at 18.
106. Fleming, Some Problems of Due Process and Fair Procedure in Labor Arbi-
tration, 13 STAN. L. REv. 235, 245, 247-48 (1961).
107. Id. Cf. FLEMING, supra note 100, at 181.
108. R. SMITH, L. MmuErRwi & D. RoTHscHa, COLLECTIVE BARGAiANG AND
LABOR ARIBrIIATION 219 (1970) [hereinafter cited as SMrH].
109. Id.
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should nevertheless be made to permit counsel for the parties to con-
front and examine them in the presence of the arbitrator."110
D. Miscellaneous Problem Areas
There are a host of other arbitration problems that could be dealt
with at some length; however, for the most part they do not have the
constitutional dimensions that were reached in the preceding discus-
sions. This subsection covers (with limited discussion) some of the
more prominent ones. While not within the category of due process,
these problem areas are closely related, and their inclusion serves to
round out the reader's understanding of the major problem areas in the
grievance arbitration setting.
1. Self-Incrimination
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination11' has
been well established in -the criminal justice system, applicable to states
as well as the federal system."' A problem arises, however, as to how
and whether this privilege should apply in an arbitral setting.
The reaction to and utilization of the Fifth Amendment by arbitra-
tors has been amazingly mixed. Many arbitrators have ruled that the
privilege against self-incrimination 'has no place in arbitration, that
arbitration in a disciplinary situation should not be viewed as a penalty
for misconduct but rather as a judgment on the satisfactoriness of the
employee.1
3
Professor Fleming of Stanford University has laid out a set of rules
for use in dealing with Fifth Amendment problems:
1. Since the privilege against self-incrimination owes much
of its existence to historical developments which have no relevancy
to the field of arbitration, the privilege should have only a very
limited application to arbitration.
2. When the grievant claims the privilege against self-
incrimination for purposes of the arbitration proceeding, either
without reference to another forum or on the ground that a criminal
proceeding elsewhere is pending against him for the same offense,
he should be advised that a failure or refusal to testify may give
rise to an inference against him.
110. FLEMING, supra at 181. See, CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. § 1282.2(d) (West 1972),
American Enka Corp., supra.
111. U.S. CONST. Amend. V, "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself. .. ."
112. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
113. SMntH, supra note 108, at 221-22. "Many arbitrators feel that the privilege
against self-incrimination has no place in the arbitration proceeding." FLEMING, supra
note 100, at 185.
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3. An adverse inference arising out of failure or refusal to
testify, whether before the arbitrator or elsewhere, will rarely, if
ever, be sufficient by itself to sustain the penalty which has been
imposed.
4. An adverse inference arising out of failure or refusal to
testify before the arbitrator or elsewhere may, when coupled with
unrefuted evidence against the grievant, be used to sustain the
penalty.
5. Insofar as the privilege against self-incrimination has any
standing before an arbitration tribunal it should not apply to other
than testimonial compulsion.114
Fleming's first rule suggests "limiting" the privilege in arbitration
proceedings. While it is not quite clear just where the limitation should
lie, it appears that most arbitrators follow the familiar "whatever is
appropriate to the facts of the case" approach. 1 5 Arbitrators should
pay careful attention to the circumstances, however, since the pressures
that can be placed on an employee to incriminate himself or herself
(at least as far as his or her job goes) can be very effective, particularly
in an interrogation setting. As stated in Miranda v. Arizona, "[tihe
circumstances surrounding incustody interrogation can operate very
quickly to overbear the will of one merely made aware of his privilege
by his interrogators."" 6
In cases involving interrogation of employees by the employer, ar-
bitrators have consistently adhered to the principle that they are not
bound by the strict rules applied in criminal proceedings .17 Instead
they have treated the problem as a question of credibility rather than
one involving rights of the grievant. Despite this shift in analysis, arbi-
trators have reached conclusions similar to those reached by the
Miranda Court."'
The Supreme Court, however, has indicated that the Fifth
114. FLEMING, note 100, at 185-86.
115. See Thrifty Drug Stores Co. Inc., 50 Lab. Arb. 1253, 1262 (1968) (E. Jones,
Jr., Arbitrator).
116. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966).
117. "I do not consider that the strict rules or vigorous practices under which the
State or Federal constitution is applied to criminal investigations necessarily apply with
equal force to private investigations by an employer into the conduct of an employee."
Weirton Steel Co., 68-1 CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDS 8249, at 3862 (1968) (Kates,
Arbitrator).
118. "The evidence of how the Company's interrogations were conducted must be
assessed, but it is important to bear in mind that the inquiry has nothing to do with
whether they are compatible with community standards of fairness and propriety. The
sole focus is on the extent to which they affected the credibility of the responses of the
employees being interrogated. If their fact-finding procedures were significantly flawed,
then the "facts" which they produced must be discounted as unreliable for the purpose
at hand." Thrift Drug Stores Co., Inc., 50 Lab. Arb. at 1258.
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Amendment privilege extends beyond criminal proceedings," 9 particu-
larly when denial of the privilege might cost the employee his or her
means of livelihood, 120 or is just "costly."'' It seems apparent then
that even if the general principle of looking to the facts of each case
in order to determine the applicability of Fifth Amendment safeguards
is followed, arbitrators should inquire into all of the circumstances
involved in -the making of the statement in judging the weight to be
given confessions and admissions of guilt.' 2  Additionally, arbitrators
should be on the lookout for the real fact situation when the employee
is discharged for refusal to cooperate in the company's investigation,
where such "refusal to cooperate" might in reality be a refusal of the
employee to incriminate himself or herself. 2 '
Professor Fleming's next three points may be considered together.
Informing the employee that his or her refusal to testify will create an
adverse inference unless the grounds for refusal involve the possible
use of the employee's statement in later criminal proceedings is reason-
able so long as the employee's right of refusal is liberally construed.
As pointed out above, no employee should be compelled to incriminate
himself or herself if it might result in loss or his or her job.
It is also beyond argument that the employer should have to sub-
stantiate the charge.'2 4  Clearly, even if an adverse inference against
the grievant is created, it should not be enough by itself to justify im-
position of penalties. Conversely, if the inference is coupled with sub-
119. "Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is
available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all set-
tings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being
compelled to incriminate themselves." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
120. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497 (1967); compare Exact Weight
Scale Co., 68-1 CCH LAB. ARB. AWARDS 8128 at 3449 (1967) (McCoy, Arbitrator),
"I know of no principle, or decided case, upholding a company's right to compel an em-
ployee, under pain of discharge, to admit or deny a rule violation or other offense. Such
a principle would contradict all our Anglo-American principles . . . ." with Edwards,
Due Process Considerations in Labor Arbitration, 25 ARB. J. 141, 147 (1970), "Thus,
it has been held that an employee's admission of guilt in a theft investigation was not
invalidated by his having been placed in fear of punishment by Company investigators
." Accord, Weirton Steel Co., 68-1 CCH LAB. Am. AWARDS 8249 (1968) (Kates,
Arbitrator).
121. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 512-15, (1967).
122. See the excellent discussion of the problem in Thrifty Drug Store Co. Inc., 50
Lab. Arb. at 1261-63.
123. See Colgate-Palmolive Co., 68-1 CCH LAB. ARB. AwARDs 8357 (1968)
(Koven, Arbitrator). But cf. Scott Paper Co., 52 Lab. Arb. 57 (1969) (Williams, Arbi-
trator).
124. FLEMING, supra note 100, at 183: "[alrbitrators now quite uniformly hold
that the employee must be reinstated where the sole cause for the discharge is the indi-
viduals unwillingness to testify."
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stantial unrefuted testimony against the grievant, an arbitrator might
well, and properly so, uphold the employers action.
Why the privilege against self-incrimination should be limited only
to "testimonial compulsion" is not clear. Utilizing the above principles,
the privilege should extend -to any situation where the employee's right
has been infringed. 1 5 Certainly under the "whatever is appropriate
under the facts of the case" approach the arbitrator should be able to
make a judgment on the application of the privilege.
2. Search and Seizure
The area of private search and seizure, wherein the company
searches the employee, or his or her locker, for evidence of misconduct
relating to her employment, is poorly defined. The basic rule of thumb
seems to be that rules relating to company search and seizure should
be strictly construed. More simply, if the company has a stated policy
requiring searching of employees entering or leaving ,the company
premises, then that will be allowed, but no other company searches
should be sustained.126  "In the absence of a clear plant rule requiring
it, an employee may not be forced . . . to submit to a search of his
person, or to disclose the contents of his pockets to the company or its
representatives."11?
Clearly, while employers may claim the right to search their
employees on company grounds for valid reasons such as theft, this
right, as indicated above, should be carefully limited to situations where
such searching involves a reasonable cause (e.g., to stop theft) and is
conducted according to a stated, well defined policy so that every
employee can be aware of the situation and understand it.'2 " The fact
125. But see Colgate-Palmolive Co., 68-1 CCH LAB. ARB. AwARws 8357, at 4226
(1968) (Williams, Arbitrator) (privilege against self-incrimination does not include
freedom from fingerprinting).
126. "Mill Rule No. 12 allows the Company to examine the contents of any and
all packages and bundles being taken in to or out of the plant by any employee. This
rule allows the Company to search an employee suspected of theft of Company property,
or for any other reason, as the employee enters or leaves the Company premises.
But Rule 12 does not give the Company the right to search an employee, other than
when he enters or leaves the plant. Therefore, the order given to the Grievant in the
Company office that he empty his pockets, was an improper order and the Grievant was
within his rights in refusing to comply with it." Scott Paper Co., 52 Lab. Arb. 57, 58-
59 (1969) (Williams, Arbitrator).
127. Id. at 59.
128. See International Nickel Co., 68-1 CCH LAB. ARB. AwARns I 8229 (1967)
(Shister, Arbitrator), where the arbitrator held that the company did not violate em-
ployees' rights when it conducted a locker search. Although the contract was silent on
the subject, the arbitrator found that the search was not arbitrary, but done pursuant
to the company's longstanding practices of locker searches. Interestingly, the arbitrator
refused to consider any constitutional aspects of the search since he considered the mat-
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that a person is an employee should not make her submit to every pass-
ing whim of the employer, and searches not conducted according to
these criteria should be disallowed by the arbitrator.
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3. Past Misconduct
It appears that the general tendency of arbitrators is to admit evi-
dence of prior misconduct as evidence against the grievant, even if the
past misconduct has no material bearing on the present charge.
Apparently this evidence is considered admissible on the idea that this
helps the arbitrator receive the maximum amount of information, the
"whole picture."'130
Professor Fleming lists four problems that may occur when such
evidence is admitted:
1. A tendency to find the grievant guilty of the offense because
he or she is a likely person to have done it.
2. A -tendency to punish the grievant for past unpunished
offenses even though he or she may not be guilty of the present charge.
3. The injustice of forcing the grievant to defend against
unexpected evidence, or evidence difficult to refute.
4. The possible confusion of the real issues.' 3 '
The professor supplies us with his own guidelines:
1. Unless the grievant has already put in evidence of his
good character, evidence of his past offenses should not be received
until the record contains more than a pro forma showing with
respect to the offenses charged.
2. When evidence of past misconduct is offered for the pur-
pose of inferring that the grievant committed the present offense
it should be admitted, provided it is of record and known to the
grievant. Such evidence should, however, be given weight only in-
sofar as there is a clear relationship between the kinds of offenses
involved, and insofar as the events have taken place within a
reasonable span of time.
3. 'When evidence of past misconduct is offered for the pur-
pose of impeaching the credibility of the grievant it should be
received, provided it does not appear to be offered simply to preju-
dice the arbitrator.
ter to be governed solely by the contract. Accord, Fruehauf Corp., 4 Lab. Arb. 89
(1967) (Daugherty, Arbitrator).
129. Compare United States v. Kahan, 350 F. Supp. 784, 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
and Congoleum-Nairn, Inc., 63-2 CCH LAB. ARn. AwAnDs 8843 (1963), (Short, Arbi-
trator) with Weirton Steel Co., 68-1 8249 (1968) (Kates, Arbitrator).
130. Stone, Due Process in Labor Arbitration, 24 N.Y.U. CoNF. LAB. 11, 19-20
(1971). See also BEATTY, LABOR-MANAGEMENT ARBIrrTION MkNuAL 65-66 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as BEATrY]; Yale Transport, Inc., 41 Lab. Arb. 736, 737 (1963),
(Kerrison, Arbitrator); Smith, supra note 108, at 216.
131. FLEmIb, supra note 100, at 169.
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4. When evidence of past misconduct is offered in order to
justify the severity of the present penalty it should normally be
received. The weight to be given such evidence will then depend
on (a) the relationship between the kinds of offenses, and (b) the
period of time involved. This rule should apply to past conduct
both within and without the company although in general the latter
evidence will carry less weight.
5. A contractual limitation on the use of the past record shall
be broadly construed to exclude such evidence.
1 3 2
A few desirable changes to be made in utilizing -the above rules
include:
1. In Rule 1, substantially more than a pro forma showing should
be made before such evidence is admitted. There should be sufficient
showing to obviate the need for such evidence except as limited by the
first clause in the rule.
2. Pertaining to Rules 3 and 4, only past misconduct that is "of
record" should be utilized.
4. Standards of Evidence
Generally, arbitrators do not apply the rules of evidence as used
in the courts.1"3 However, it has been suggested that in instances in-
volving serious crimes, moral turpitude, subversion, etc., where an
adverse decision may brand the grievant for life, a very strict standard
(similar to criminal standard, i.e.: proof beyond a reasonable doubt)
should be followed.
13 4
132. Id. at 169-70.
133. See FAmwATBER, supra note 79, at 210; BEATrY, supra note 130, at 57;
SMrrH, supra note 108, at 213. See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
134. Aaron, Some Procedural Problems in Arbitration, 10 VAND. L. RPv. 733, 741-
42 (1957); see also discussion of the different standards of evidence used by arbitrators
in Cannon Electric Co., 28 Lab. Arb. 879, 882-83 (1957) (Jones, Arbitrator) "It is
often said, sometimes uncritically, that discharge is the economic equivalent of capitol
punishment. Yet it is clear that in an area where there is a shortage of the particular
skills possessed by the discharged employee competitive labor conditions may well
largely (aside from seniority) redress the injustice of a mistaken or unjust discharge.
Perhaps in such a case the application by an arbitrator of either the 'clear and convinc-
ing' or the 'reasonable apprehension' standards of proof would protect the rights of the
grievant. But where the local labor situation means an employee is not readily employ-
able elsewhere, or where, as here, discharge is based upon an allegation involving moral
turpitude which, if upheld, will blackball the discharged employee elsewhere, a rigorous
standard of proof seems applicable .... In the context of a moral turpitude discharge,
therefore, protection of an innocent employee against the injustice of industrial black-
balling and social ostracism demands the most careful and exacting scrutiny to assure
that the facts alleged as the basis for the discharge actually exist. That kind of scrutiny
is embodied by the community in its criminal law under a standard which is phrased
to require that guilt be demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt in the mind of the
trier of facts by facts and their necessary inferences." (Cannon, at 883). Accord,
Thrifty Drug Stores, Inc., 50 Lab. Arb. at 1258. Cf. Braniff Airways, Inc., 44 Lab.
Arb. 417, 421 (1965) (Rohman, Arbitrator).
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The American Arbitration Association and some of the state codes
indicate that the arbitrator has wide discretion in this area.135
5. Burden of Proof
The general rule regarding the burden of proof is that in nondis-
ciplinary proceedings the grieving party bears the initial burden,136 and
in disciplinary proceedings, particularly in discharge cases, management
has the burden of proving its case.
37
Conclusion
The use of arbitration proceedings has become an integral part of
the contemporary collective bargaining relationship between employers
and their employees. Arbitration provides a peaceful means of settling
employer-employee disputes. There is, however, a potential for abuse
in that procedural rights of employees in arbitration hearings are
generally not guaranteed by the arbitral agreement. Constitutional due
process guarantees could be introduced if the action in the arbitration
hearing could be attributed to the state or federal government. The
link between the government and the arbitral process is provided by
the statutory authority granted the union to represent the employee in
the hearing and by the finality attached to the proceeding by federal
law. Additional governmental action is found in a court's enforcement
of an arbitration award at the request of either party. Whether pro-
cedural safeguards are in fact afforded depends as much upon the ease
with which they can be incorporated into the arbitral process as upon
the finding of governmental action. It has been shown here that due
process requirements are sufficiently flexible to permit their introduc-
tion without undue disturbance of the arbitral process or emasculation
of the protection sought to be achieved. Among those areas of due
process which could be incorporated readily are the right to notice and
appearance, the right to counsel, and thn right of confrontation and
cross-examination of witnesses. Another procedural safeguard that
135. Rule 28 ARBrIRATION RuLES, supra note 82, at 5; CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §
1282.2(d) (West 1972): Note that a refusal by the arbitrator to hear evidence pertinent
to the inquiry may be misbehavior on her part. Industrial Due Process, supra note 80,
at 619.
136. FAiRWEATHER, supra note 79, at 196.
137. Id. at 198; cf. BEA=rY, supra note 130, at 60: "Perhaps it is more appropri-
ate to say that both parties run the risk of nonpersuasion." SatTH, supra note 108,
at 229: "Ihe 'rule' generally recognized by arbitrators seems to be, as in court cases,
that the party holding the affirmative of an issue must produce evidence sufficient to
prove the facts essential to his claim; therefore the burden of proof is held to rest on
the party against whom the arbitrator would hold if no evidence were given on either
side."
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should be included is the privilege against self-incrimination. In
light of the serious consequences which may result from denial of these
protections to a grievant, the ease with which they may be afforded,
and the comparatively insubstantial effects on the union-employer rela-
tionship, the balance weighs in favor of a fair and just hearing for the
individual.

